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 TEMPORARY VICTIMS: INTERPRETING THE 
FEDERAL FRAUD AND THEFT SENTENCING 
GUIDELINE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In most cases, it is easy to identify the victim of a crime.  The battery 
victim with a broken nose, the larceny victim who lost his wallet, and the 
arson victim whose home has burned to the ground are all readily identifiable.  
In rare instances, however, it is unclear whether an individual who has 
suffered from the criminal conduct of another is truly a ―victim,‖ at least for 
purposes of federal sentencing.  The determination can alter a prison sentence 
by years. 
Take the case of individual ―victims‖ of bank fraud.  In most of these 
cases, banks reimburse account holders for fraudulent charges.  Thus, while a 
fraudulent ATM charge may cost an individual $300 for a brief time, her 
lender will quickly make her financially whole.  Narrowly interpreting the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), some courts have concluded that 
such reimbursed individuals are not ―victims‖ when determining a convicted 
defendant‘s appropriate sentencing range.1  Rather, only the lending 
institution that ultimately suffers the financial loss is included as a victim.
2
  
This determination can alternatively double or halve a defendant‘s sentence.3 
And yet, though the individuals in these cases are ―made whole,‖ they are 
still likely to feel victimized.  Beyond just a lingering sense of victimization 
and a lack of trust in the security of their possessions, these individuals suffer 
loss because they frequently spend time and effort as a result of the crime.  
For example, such victims may need to contact their banks several times to 
secure reimbursement.  Some victims must endure a long battle with credit 
reporting agencies to restore their credit histories and reputations.  In cases 
where a ―victim‖ goes to such lengths, excluding him from the victim total 
would distort the severity of the crime and improperly exclude the value of 
the time spent by the individual. 
Further, Congress approved the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to 
establish a system of uniform and proportionate sentencing.
4
  A circuit split 
emerged as some courts included reimbursed individuals as victims and other 
courts denied such treatment.  Consequently, similar defendants committing 
 
1. See infra Part III.A. 
2. See id. 
3. See infra notes 69–72 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra Part II.A. 
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similar crimes received different sentences.  Because such variances are at 
odds with the fundamental goals of the Guidelines, the Federal Sentencing 
Commission amended the ―number-of-victims‖ provision to ensure consistent 
treatment of reimbursed parties.  Yet the recent amendment is flawed as well. 
Part II of this Comment examines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
focusing on their history and objectives, their application, and the fraud and 
theft guideline.  Part III analyzes the cases interpreting the number-of-victims 
provision of the Guidelines and the circuit split that has developed.  Part IV 
addresses the recent amendment and explains why both the plain text and the 
purposes of the Guidelines support a reasonably broad interpretation of 
―victims.‖  Finally, Part V concludes with a few thoughts on why the Federal 
Sentencing Commission and federal courts should interpret ―victim‖ in a way 
that comports with its everyday meaning. 
II.  FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have a profound impact on the 
sentencing of guilty defendants in federal courts.
5
  Through the Guidelines, 
Congress attempts to control crime through fair and effective sentencing that 
emphasizes honesty, uniformity, and proportionality.
6
  The Guidelines include 
an entry governing the sentencing of every federal crime.  Guideline section 
2B1.1 covers fraud crimes.  The fraud crimes guideline includes a potential 
sentence enhancement based on the number of victims of the crime.
7
  As the 
number of victims rises, the sentencing range increases.
8
  Thus, federal courts 
must determine an accurate and consistent interpretation of ―victim‖ to ensure 
uniform and proportionate sentencing. 
A.  History and Purpose 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were created and are overseen today 
by the Federal Sentencing Commission (Commission), a permanent 
administrative agency created by Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984.
9
  Congress charged the Commission with a thorough review of federal 
sentencing procedures and vested the Commission with broad authority to 
develop sentencing rules that would further two basic goals of criminal 
 
5. Until the Supreme Court‘s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the 
Guidelines almost entirely controlled federal sentencing.  Still, all sentencing decisions must begin 
with the determination of the appropriate Guidelines range.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 
(2007). 
6. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2009). 
7. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2). 
8. Id. 
9. The Sentencing Reform Act was enacted as Chapter II of the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–2034 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3551–3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–998 (2006)). 
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punishment: deterrence and retribution.
10
  The fundamental goal of the 
Sentencing Reform Act was ―to enhance the ability of the criminal justice 
system to combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing system.‖11  To 
achieve this goal, Congress directed the Commission to create guidelines that 
fulfilled three qualities: honesty, uniformity, and proportionality.
12
 
The Commission easily achieved the goal of honesty; in the Guidelines, 
the Commission has abolished parole and severely limited sentencing 
reductions for good behavior.
13
  Prior to the implementation of the Guidelines, 
―truth-in-sentencing‖ was rare.14  Federal sentencing was an indeterminate 
system where judges had broad discretion to choose prison sentences from 
large statutory windows.
15
  Once a prisoner went to prison, however, parole 
boards largely controlled the length of sentences through their broad power to 
grant or deny parole.
16
  As a result, convicted criminals in the federal system 
often spent just one-third of their prescribed sentences in prison.
17
  Under the 
Guidelines, however, sentence reductions for good behavior are limited to 
fifty-four days per year, a maximum of less than 15%.
18
  Thus, barring 
exceptional circumstances, federal prisoners will serve at least 85% of their 
proscribed sentence before being released. 
In addition to honesty, Congress sought a system of sentencing that 
achieved some degree of uniformity.
19
  Because of the great discretion 
afforded to parole boards and judges prior to the implementation of the 
Guidelines, federal sentences often varied dramatically for offenders whose 
offenses and criminal history were largely similar.
20
  To combat this perceived 
injustice, Congress tried to create a system that would limit the flexibility of 
judges to vary their sentences and eliminate parole.
21
  Congress mandated that 
 
10. Id. at 2018.  Notably, Congress explicitly rejected rehabilitation as a goal of federal 
criminal sentencing.  See ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 4:6, at 134 n.7 (3d ed. 
2004). 
11. USSG § 1A1.3.  Academics and judges alike question whether the Guidelines have 
succeeded in this endeavor.  See, e.g., Louis F. Oberdorfer, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge’s 
Perspective, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 11, 17–18 (2003) (blaming the Guidelines‘ failure on the lack of 
discretion afforded judges). 
12. USSG § 1A1.3. 
13. Id. § 1A1.2. 
14. Id. § 1A1.3. 
15. See id.; see also Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The 
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 223–30 
(1993). 
16. USSG § 1A1.3. 
17. Id.; see Stith & Koh, supra note 15, at 227–28. 
18. USSG § 1A1.3. 
19. Id. 
20. See CAMPBELL, supra note 10, § 4:6, at 134. 
21. USSG § 1A1.2. 
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the Commission create small ranges for judges to use that would be based on 
the severity of the crime committed and an individual‘s criminal history.22 
Finally, Congress sought proportional sentencing.
23
  Proportionality 
means that criminals committing more serious crimes receive longer 
sentences; criminals committing less serious crimes are punished less 
severely.  Again, because of varying degrees of leniency granted by parole 
boards and judges, sentences fluctuated considerably.
24
  The natural 
consequence of these fluctuations was that some criminals who committed 
more serious crimes received shorter sentences than others who committed 
less serious crimes.
25
  The Commission pored over research to create a rough 
hierarchy of crimes to determine their severity.
26
  The Commission also listed 
various aggravating and mitigating factors within the Guidelines to 
differentiate between more and less serious degrees of criminal conduct 
within the same general offense.
27
 
The Supreme Court has addressed a number of challenges to the 
Guidelines in the last twenty years.  Soon after the implementation of the 
Guidelines, the Court upheld their constitutionality against claims that they 
violated nondelegation and separation of powers principles.
28
  In 2005, 
however, the Court ruled that mandatory application of the Guidelines is 
unconstitutional.
29
  Consequently, today federal judges may impose non-
Guidelines sentences.
30
  Despite the Booker Court‘s relegation of the 
Guidelines to an advisory position, they are still important: The first step in 
determining any federal sentence, even if deviating from the Guidelines, is to 
 
22. USSG § 1A1.3.  Congress mandated that the upper-end of each sentencing range generally 
could not exceed the lower-end by the greater of six months or 25%.  28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2006). 
23. USSG § 1A1.3. 
24. See CAMPBELL, supra note 10, § 4:6, at 134. 
25. The Commission saw this effect frequently in cases of economic crime, such as fraud and 
embezzlement.  Criminals committing such crimes generally received shorter sentences than similar 
criminals who exhibited ―other apparently equivalent behavior.‖  USSG § 1A1.3.  
26. Id. 
27. See infra Part II.B. for details on the application of aggravating and mitigating factors. 
28. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72, 412 (1989).  The Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Guidelines in spite of a number of collateral attacks as well.  See Susan R. 
Klein & Sandra Guerra Thompson, DOJ’s Attack on Federal Judicial “Leniency,” the Supreme 
Court’s Response, and the Future of Criminal Sentencing, 44 TULSA L. REV. 519, 536 (2009) (―In 
every case directly challenging their constitutionality [prior to 2000], . . . the Court upheld the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines from attack.‖). 
29. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  In a badly fractured decision that included 
six separate opinions, and in which eight justices dissented on at least one point, the Court held, inter 
alia, that mandatory application of the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee 
in that it required judges to sentence defendants based on findings of fact that were neither admitted 
by the defendant nor accepted by the jury as true beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 249–53. 
30. See id. 
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determine the appropriate Guidelines sentence.
31
 
B.  How Courts Apply the Guidelines 
A complex multi-step process is used to determine the recommended 
sentencing range under the Guidelines.
32
  First, the court must determine the 
offense level, measuring the severity of the crime, according to the rules 
promulgated by the Federal Sentencing Commission.
33
  Every offense has a 
base level that can be increased or decreased based on enhancing and 
mitigating factors.
34
  Next, the court must determine the criminal history of 
the defendant based on the quantity and severity of previous convictions.
35
  
These two factors combine to provide the basic sentencing range for a 
particular crime and defendant.
36
  Judges may deviate upward or downward 
from that range if they conclude that further mitigating or enhancing factors 




Every federal crime has a base level that the Federal Sentencing 
Commission determines based on the seriousness of the offense, ranging from 
one to forty-three.
38
  The court determines the base level applicable to the 
crime and then evaluates the Guideline section to determine whether any 
specific offense characteristics apply.
39
  After going through the specific 
section to determine whether to apply any specific offense characteristics, the 
court turns to the remainder of the Guidelines to determine whether any large-
scale adjustments apply.
40
  The result of these additions and subtractions is the 
defendant‘s offense level. 
The court then turns to the criminal history of the defendant, which is 
 
31. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 
32. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2009).  The use of this technical process 
has come under severe criticism.  See Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1342–43 (2005) (―[T]he complexity of 
the sentencing table and accompanying rules is an important cause of many common complaints 
about federal sentencing.‖).  See generally KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1998). 
33. USSG § 1B1.1(a). 
34. Id. § 1B1.1(b)–(e). 
35. Id. § 1B1.1(f). 
36. Id. § 1B1.1(g). 
37. Id. § 1B1.1(h)–(i). 
38. Id. §§ 1B1.1(a), 1B1.2(a), 2A. 
39. Id. § 1B1.1(b).  An example of an offense characteristic specific to the fraud guideline is 
the total loss incurred or intended in the fraud.  A loss of $5,000 to $9,999 causes a two-level 
increase, while a $400 million loss causes a thirty-level increase.  Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
40. Id. § 1B1.1(c).  For example, the offense level for all crimes is lowered for individuals who 
had a minimal role in the commission of a crime or who cooperated with authorities.  Conversely, 
leaders and organizers face an increased offense level.  Id. § 3B. 
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determined on a six-point scale.
41
  To determine an individual‘s score on this 
scale, the court must calculate the number of ―criminal history points‖ a 
defendant has accumulated.
42
  Defendants receive three points for each prior 
conviction that had a prison sentence of more than thirteen months, two points 
for each sentence of sixty days to thirteen months, and one point for any other 
convictions.
43
  The resulting total is transferred onto the six-point scale: 
defendants with zero or one criminal history points score a I, while those with 
thirteen or more score a VI.
44
 
Finally, the court combines the offense level with the criminal history 
score to determine an individual‘s recommended Guidelines sentence.45  Once 
the court has this information, it may deviate from the sentence based on 




It is difficult to see how the Guidelines function without using a real 
example.  The fraud section provides a good illustration.  As a hypothetical, 
imagine a bank fraud scheme where the defendant stole $2,000,000 before 
being arrested.  The base level for most federal fraud crimes is six.
47
  Assume 
that the only specific offense characteristic applicable to the crime is for the 
$2,000,000 loss.  Losses of more than $1,000,000 but less than $2,500,000 
add sixteen levels to the offense level.
48
  Further, assume that no other 
enhancing or mitigating factors are applicable to this defendant.  Thus, the 
defendant‘s offense level is twenty-two.49  If this defendant is a first-time 
criminal with a criminal history score of I, his recommended sentence is  
41–51 months (3.42–4.25 years).50  If, on the other hand, he is a repeat 
offender with a criminal history score of VI, his recommended sentence is  
 
41. Id. §§ 1B1.1(f), 4A1.1. 
42. Id. § 4A1.1. 
43. Id.  There are a number of other technical rules beyond the scope of this Note including, for 
example, adjustments for probation violations, career criminal conduct, and foreign criminal 
convictions. 
44. Id. § 5A. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. § 1B1.1(i); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
47. USSG § 2B1.1(a)(2).  The base level is seven in cases where the defendant is convicted of a 
fraud or a theft crime meriting the statutory maximum penalty of twenty years or more.  Id. 
§ 2B1.1(a)(1). 
48. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I). 
49. Six for the base offense level plus sixteen for the adjustment based on the $2,000,000 loss.  
Note that in cases such as this, the amount of loss has a much larger role in determining the ultimate 
sentencing range than the base level of this crime.  This is in accord with the proportionality goal of 
the Guidelines.  A fraud scheme that nets a few thousand dollars is much less serious than one that 
causes a multimillion-dollar loss.  Sentences naturally reflect this disparity. 
50. Id. § 5A.   
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84–105 months (7.00–8.75 years).51 
C.  The Fraud and Theft Guideline
52
 
As noted above, the base offense level for most fraud and theft crimes 
under the Guidelines is six.
53
  The only exception is for crimes that have a 
statutory maximum penalty of twenty years or more, in which case the base 
level is seven.
54
  In addition to the number-of-victims enhancement, there are 
several other specific offense characteristics applicable to this section.  For 
example, courts add two levels when the defendant commits a theft from the 
person of another.
55
  The section also provides for two-level increases for 
misrepresentations that the defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable 
organization
56
 and the use of fraudulent means of identification in a fraud or 
theft crime.
57
  In total, there are sixteen offense characteristics specific to the 
fraud and theft guideline.
58
 
Among the specific offense characteristics is an enhancement based on the 
number of victims of the crime.
59
  As the number of victims increases, the 
offense level rises as well.  The current version of the Guidelines provides for 
three levels of increases: a two-level increase for a crime that victimizes at 
least ten parties,
60
 a four-level increase for a crime with fifty or more 
victims,
61
 and a six-level increase for a crime with 250 or more victims.
62
 
The controversy surrounding the application of this enhancement arises 
from the section‘s definition of ―victim,‖ which does not directly address 
situations of reimbursement.  Under the Guidelines, a ―victim‖ is ―any person 
who sustained any part of the actual loss determined under‖ the loss 
calculation.
63
  Thus, when determining who is a victim of a fraud crime, 
 
51. Id. 
52. The full title of Guideline Section 2B1.1 is ―Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of 
Theft; Offenses Involving Stolen Property; Property Damage or Destruction; Fraud and Deceit; 
Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer 
Obligations of the United States.‖  It covers a wider range of conduct than just fraud and theft, but as 
those are the most commonly charged crimes under this section, commentators generally refer to it 
by the shortened title.   
53. USSG § 2B1.1(a)(2). 
54. Id. § 2B1.1(a)(1). 
55. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(3). 
56. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(8). 
57. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(10). 
58. As noted in Part II.B., the largest potential increase comes from the loss enhancement, 
which can raise the offense level as much as thirty levels.  Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(P). 
59. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2). 
60. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i). 
61. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B). 
62. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C). 
63. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1.  ―Person‖ includes both individuals and business entities.  Id. 
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courts must look to the loss determination.  ―Actual loss‖ is ―the reasonably 
foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.‖64  Finally, 
―pecuniary harm‖ is ―harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily 
measurable in money.  Accordingly, pecuniary harm does not include 
emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other non-economic harm.‖65  Thus, 
a victim is any person (1) who sustains harm that is either monetary or readily 
measurable in money, (2) whose harm resulted from the criminal offense, and 
(3) whose harm is included in the total loss calculation.
66
 
The definition is inadequate because it is initially unclear whether a 
person who suffers a temporary monetary loss should be included in the 
victim calculation.  Take, for example, a credit cardholder whose lender 
guarantees that any fraudulent charges will be reimbursed.  Individual victims 
in these cases may suffer a temporary monetary loss, but the ultimate 
monetary loss is borne by the lending agency.  If individuals are included as 
victims due to this specific monetary loss, courts run the risk of ―double 
counting‖ the actual loss as determined in the loss calculation.67  Yet, it runs 




The interpretation of this enhancement is more than a mere academic 
exercise.  It has a significant impact on the potential sentences of those 
convicted for federal fraud and theft crimes.  Take the same hypothetical used 
above (fraud crime where the defendant stole $2,000,000 and had an offense 
level of twenty-two).  Assume that this criminal fraudulently charged the 
$2,000,000 on 300 individual bank accounts.  Further, assume that the 
ultimate loss was borne by five credit card companies.  If a court determines 
that only five victims exist for the purpose of the Guidelines, the final offense 
level is twenty-two, as there is no number-of-victims increase for crimes 
involving fewer than ten victims.  If, however, the court determines that all 
300 individuals are victims in addition to the lenders, the final level rises to 
twenty-eight, due to the six-level increase for crimes of 250 or more victims.  
 
64. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i). 
65. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii). 
66. See United States v. Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2008), for a similar, though 
slightly differently worded, definition. 
67. See United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 782 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying individuals 
recognition as victims when the government claimed the same actual loss for the individuals  and for 
institutional lenders).  But see United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 55–56 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding 
reimbursed parties suffered the same loss as reimbursing institutions at different times). 
68. See United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 494 (5th Cir. 2008) (Garza, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (questioning the proportionality of imposing the same sentences on two 
defendants when one defrauded many more individuals); see also USSG § 1A1.3 for a discussion of 
uniform and proportionate sentencing. 
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A six-level increase roughly doubles the recommended sentencing range.
69
  
As noted above, the recommended sentence for a defendant with an offense 
level of twenty-two and a criminal history of I is forty-one to fifty-one 
months.
70
  At level twenty-eight, the recommended sentence is seventy-eight 
to ninety-seven months.
71
  The difference at the midpoints of the two ranges is 
41.5 months (nearly 3.5 years).  Thus, if two defendants in different circuits 
commit the exact same crime, they could receive substantially different 
sentences.
72
  To ensure uniform sentencing for fraud crimes, it is crucial that 
federal courts interpret the number-of-victims enhancement consistently 
across the nation. 
III.  APPELLATE INTERPRETATION 
Eight circuits have addressed the number-of-victims enhancement, with 
three interpretations emerging from the cases.  Four circuits have adopted a 
narrow interpretation of ―victim‖ that excludes reimbursed parties.73  Two 
circuits have adopted a broad interpretation that would automatically include 
such individuals.
74
  Finally, two circuits have adopted a middle approach that 
would potentially include reimbursed parties as victims, but only if they suffer 
a loss in addition to the reimbursed money, and if that loss is measured 
separately from the financial loss suffered by the lenders.
75
 
To a degree, the tests adopted by each circuit resulted from the facts of 
each case.  Courts that adopted a broad definition of ―victim‖ tended to do so 
in cases where the reimbursed party spent more time and effort in securing the 
reimbursement, while many of the purported victims in the narrow 
interpretation line of cases were completely unaware of the crimes committed 
against them.  To resolve this split, the Federal Sentencing Commission 
amended the Guidelines, adding a provision discussed infra in Part IV. 
A.  The Narrow Interpretation—United States v. Yagar 
The first line of cases almost categorically rejected the inclusion of 
reimbursed parties as victims for sentencing.  Though some of the courts left 
open a narrow exception for cases where parties went to extraordinary lengths 
 
69. USSG § 5A. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. See infra Part III. 
73. See United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 422 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Conner, 
537 F.3d 480, 489 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Icaza, 492 F.3d 967, 969 (8th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005). 
74. See United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Lee, 427 
F.3d 881, 895 (11th Cir. 2005). 
75. See United States v. Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 782 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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to secure reimbursement, the case law makes clear that those cases are out of 
the ordinary.  United States v. Yagar
76
 largely exemplifies the arguments 
made in this line of cases. 
The Yagar court was the first federal appellate court to address the issue 
of the status of reimbursed parties as victims.
77
  In Yagar, the defendant 
engaged in a mail theft and bank fraud scheme where she used stolen checks 
to deposit money into several victims‘ bank accounts.78  After depositing the 
money, she withdrew a share of it using the victims‘ stolen account 
information.
79
  All told, Yagar stole more than $20,000 out of forty-seven 
bank accounts belonging to more than sixty individuals.
80
  Of those sixty, at 
least six spent money to purchase new checks following the theft, and it was 
unclear from the record whether the individuals‘ banks ever reimbursed them 
for the cost of the checks.
81
  With the possible exception of those check 
purchases, five banks completely reimbursed all individual losses.
82
 
Yagar pleaded guilty to mail theft
83





  The presentence investigation report did 
not recommend an enhancement based on the number of victims, but the 
government filed a position paper recommending a four-level enhancement on 
the grounds that Yagar‘s crime involved more than fifty victims.86  The 
district court rejected the government‘s request for a four-level enhancement 
but granted a two-level enhancement based on its determination that there 
were eleven victims of this crime.
87
  The court concluded that the six account 
holders who spent money buying new checks were victims along with the five 
banks who bore the ultimate loss.
88
 
On appeal, the government argued that even a temporary loss qualifies an 
individual as a victim under the fraud and theft guideline because the 
Guidelines provide no indication as to when the actual loss must occur.
89
  By 
 
76. 404 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2005). 
77. Id.  Yagar has been cited persuasively by other circuits that have adopted this narrow 
interpretation.  See Kennedy, 554 F.3d at 420; Conner, 537 F.3d at 489. 
78. 404 F.3d at 968. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 968, 970. 
81. Id. at 971–72. 
82. Id. at 971. 
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (2000). 
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2000). 
85. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 968. 
86. Id. at 968. 
87. Id. at 968–69. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 971.  The government has repeatedly adopted this reasoning in cases with reimbursed 
parties.  See, e.g., United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 490 (5th Cir. 2008).  The Conner court held 
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this reasoning, each individual account holder would be a victim from the 
moment Yagar depleted the individual‘s account, regardless of whether the 
individual purchased new checks or was later reimbursed.  Yagar appealed 
and argued that the banks were the only victims of the crime because they 
suffered the ultimate loss and the evidence as to the check purchases was 
insufficient to increase her sentence.
90
 
The Sixth Circuit rejected the government‘s argument and agreed with 
Yagar‘s argument, concluding that neither the account holders as a group nor 
the individuals who purchased checks were victims.
91
  The court ruled that the 
individuals who purchased new checks were not victims because the evidence 
in the record was insufficient to support a conclusion that the banks never 
reimbursed the individuals.
92
  More substantively, the court concluded that the 
sixty account holders were not victims.
93
  The court reasoned that because the 
banks immediately reimbursed the individual losses, the individuals suffered 
no practical adverse effect from the crime.
94
  Without such an adverse effect, 
the individuals were not victims.
95
 
The court, however, left open the possibility that individuals suffering 
temporary losses under other circumstances could be victims, enigmatically 
noting, ―[T]here may be situations in which a person could be considered a 
‗victim‘ under the Guidelines even though he or she is ultimately 
reimbursed.‖96  The court did not specify the circumstances in which a court 
 
that it would take ―a strained reading‖ of the Guidelines to conclude that individuals become victims 
at the moment of a loss, and remain so even after being reimbursed.  Id.  This, however, is exactly 
what the broad interpretation courts have concluded.  See United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 56 
(1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 895 (11th Cir. 2005). 
90. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 969. 
91. Id. at 971–72. 
92. Id.  
93. Id. at 971. 
94. Id.; cf. United States v. Icaza, 492 F.3d 967, 969 (8th Cir. 2007).  In Icaza, defendants stole 
merchandise from hundreds of Walgreens stores.  Id. at 968–69.  The government argued that each 
Walgreens franchisee (and, in the alternative, that each shareholder) was a victim, but the court 
concluded that only the corporate parent, who reimbursed the individual stores, was a victim.  Id. at 
970.  The court relied heavily on testimony from a Walgreens corporate executive, who testified that 
―ultimately the corporation takes the loss.‖  Id. at 969. 
95. Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971. 
96. Id.  Other courts in this line have likewise claimed that under different facts, a reimbursed 
party could be a victim.  See United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 491 (5th Cir. 2008) (―The 
evidence here indicated that the account holders were quickly reimbursed for the improper charges 
on their accounts.  If they had paid those charges and encountered difficulty in obtaining 
reimbursement, a different question would be presented.‖).  One court went so far as to dismiss the 
existence of a circuit split, and instead concluded that courts adopting the broad interpretation merely 
―fell within the Yagar carve-out for those who could be considered victims, despite ultimately being 
reimbursed, because they suffered some additional harm.‖  United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 
421 (3d Cir. 2009).  Because the tests adopted by the other lines are logically distinct from the tests 
adopted by the narrow line, this Comment concludes that the broad interpretations are not merely 
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should consider a reimbursed party in the victim calculations.  Presumably, 
the government would need to show that the individuals suffered some 
adverse effect as a result of the crime, but it is unclear what kind of temporary 
losses would suffice in this and other ―narrow‖ circuits. 
At least one court in this line of cases has rejected the use of logic in 
concluding that reimbursed parties are victims.  In United States v. Conner,
97
 
the trial court reasoned that as a matter of ―‗garden-variety logic,‘‖ some of 
the businesses defrauded in a fraud scheme must have lost business time in 
trying to obtain reimbursement after the fraudulent charges, but the court 
admitted that it had no evidence for this conclusion.
98
  On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit explicitly noted that the businesses were quickly reimbursed and did 
not encounter any difficulties or debts as a result of the crime.
99
  Addressing 
the trial court‘s garden-variety logic, the court held that courts must base any 
sentencing enhancements on a preponderance of the evidence.
100
  The court 
left open the possibility of including business losses as part of the victim 
calculation but held that ―the district court‘s speculation as to the existence of 
these facts was an insufficient basis to enhance Conner‘s sentence.‖101 
Courts in this line of cases have generally concluded that a plain reading 
of the text of the fraud guideline reveals that reimbursed parties cannot be 
victims.
102
  Generally, they have offered little analysis for this proposition.
103
  
This lack of analysis is problematic, especially because other courts have 
concluded that reimbursed parties may be victims.  Indeed, in the circuits that 
have adopted a broad definition of ―victim,‖ reimbursed parties are 
necessarily victims. 
B.  The Broad Interpretation—United States v. Stepanian 
Two circuits have completely rejected the methodology offered by the 
preceding line of cases and instead have held that any party who loses 
money—even temporarily—is a victim from the time of the initial loss.  In 
 
exceptions to the narrow rule, but rather demonstrate the existence of a circuit split. 
97. 537 F.3d at 491. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 491–92. 
101. Id. at 491.  Unlike the other cases in this line, Conner provoked a dissent that advocated 
for a broader interpretation of ―victim.‖  Id. at 493 (Garza, J., dissenting).  Judge Garza examined the 
purposes of the Guidelines, and concluded that the reasoning of the majority (as well as the Yagar 
and Icaza courts) ―runs counter to the fundamental sentencing goal of tying the severity of a 
defendant‘s sentence to the seriousness of the defendant‘s crime.‖  Id. at 494.   
102. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 419 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding, with no 
analysis, that it was ―undisputed‖ that the account holders did not sustain any part of the loss by 
virtue of the reimbursement). 
103. Id. 
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these circuits, reimbursement is irrelevant in determining whether a party is a 
victim for sentencing purposes.  United States v. Stepanian
104
 best exemplifies 
this line of cases. 
In Stepanian, the defendant was part of a team that stole credit and debit 
card information by replacing debit card terminals at grocery stores.
105
  Video 
surveillance eventually revealed the operation, and a store employee contacted 
police when he recognized one of the defendant‘s coconspirators from the 
video.
106
  The defendant was arrested while sitting in a getaway car outside 
the front of the store.
107
  It is unclear from the court‘s opinion precisely how 
many individuals‘ information the conspirators possessed; however, the 
number surely exceeded 250 because the court applied the six-level 
enhancement.  The unauthorized charges on these accounts prior to arrest 
totaled more than $130,000.
108
 
The defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit access device 
fraud
109
 and aggravated identity theft,
110
 and was sentenced to seventy-two 
months in prison.
111
  The defendant‘s offense level for sentencing included a 
six-level enhancement for a crime with 250 or more victims.
112
  The trial court 
concluded that the parties whose accounts were fraudulently charged were 
victims based on the initial act of having money taken from their account, 
regardless of future reimbursement: 
―[T]here has been loss experienced by all the victims in the 
case.  The loss experienced by the individual victims may 
have been for a short period of time, might have been for a 
week or two weeks or for a day, whatever the case may be.  
There was reimbursement, no doubt, that occurred, but I don‘t 
think the guidelines speak in terms of the length of time that a 
victim is deprived of their money or access to their money 
any more than in any other crime of fraud or that involves 
stealing, that the question of whether the person is a victim is 
determined by whether they‘re deprived of their resources for 
an hour, a day, a month or a year . . . .  It seems to me these 
 
104. 570 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2009). 
105. Id. at 53.  The terminals they swapped in place of the original terminals collected users‘ 
account numbers and PIN codes.  Id.  
106. Id.  The video also revealed how easy the switches were.  One of the defendants distracted 
a night clerk with conversation while two others switched out the terminals.  Id.  Amazingly, the 
switches took only twelve seconds.  Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2) (2006). 
110. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006). 
111. Stepanian, 570 F.3d at 52. 
112. Id. at 54. 
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people were victims because money was stolen from their 
accounts.‖113 
Because the individuals were deprived of their property, regardless of how 
long the deprivation lasted, the court considered them victims. 
On appeal, the First Circuit agreed with the trial court‘s analysis and 
concluded that the reimbursed parties were victims under the fraud and theft 
guideline‘s definition.114  In doing so, the court accepted an argument rejected 
by those courts that adopted the narrow definition of ―victim.‖  Specifically, 
the court held that the parties were victims at the moment of the withdrawal, 
and later reimbursement did not delete them from the victim roll.
115
  Noting 
that a victim must sustain a part of the ―actual loss,‖ the Stepanian court 
concluded that actual loss included a temporal dimension.
116
  Thus, the 
reimbursed parties sustained actual loss during the period before the 
reimbursement, while the lenders sustained actual loss following the 
reimbursement. 
The court explicitly broke with the narrow line of cases in taking this 
position.
117
  It rejected the Yagar court‘s assertion that the reimbursed 
individuals did not ―suffer any ‗adverse effect as a practical matter.‘‖118  To 
show that the reimbursed individuals did in fact suffer from the crime, the 
court noted the ―‗declaration of victim losses‘‖ statements used by the trial 
court: 
The declarations reveal that one victim who was traveling 
abroad could not pay her travel expenses during the period of 
the theft.  Another victim described how he and his family 
had no money for food and gas for a period of time because 
of the theft, and how their card was denied when they tried to 
use it to pay for their son‘s birthday party.  That victim 
concluded ―it put a big financial burden on my family for a 
few weeks.‖  Although every victim of the scheme may not 
have a similarly dramatic story, these declarations provide 
tangible support for our conclusion that even where losses are 
reimbursed, unauthorized withdrawals from bank accounts 
 
113. Id. (quoting the trial court at sentencing). 
114. Id. at 55. 
115. Id.  At least two circuits explicitly rejected this argument when the government made it, 
concluding that the guideline does not ―‗stop the clock‘‖ and create victims at the moment of the 
offense.  United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 490 (5th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Yagar, 
404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005).  
116. Stepanian, 570 F.3d at 55. 
117. Id. at 56 (―In drawing this conclusion, we reject the position of some other circuits that the 
account holders did not suffer actual pecuniary harm, ‗readily measurable in money,‘ because their 
losses were reimbursed.‖). 
118. Id. (citing Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971). 
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cause real economic harm.
119
 
The court further noted, however, that the government need not show this 




The court‘s textual analysis also led it to adopt the broad interpretation. 121  
Included in the loss calculation provision of the fraud and theft guideline is a 
―Credits Against Loss‖ provision.122  The provision provides that loss should 
be reduced by any amount returned by the defendant ―to the victim.‖123  The 
First Circuit found this language persuasive in showing that the provision 
presupposes that an individual is a victim at the time of loss and remains so 
even if he is entirely reimbursed.
124
 
The Eleventh Circuit also found this language persuasive when adopting 
the broad interpretation: 
When considering the impact of recovered collateral, or the 
return of money, property, or services, to the victim, the 
Guidelines treat those so recovering as having suffered a loss 
but then allow the defendant to take credit against the total 
loss for the value of the recovered or returned loss.  Stated 
another way, inherent in the credit against loss provision is an 
acknowledgment that there was in fact an initial loss, even 
though it was subsequently remedied by recovery of collateral 
 
119. Stepanian, 570 F.3d at 56. 
120. Id. at 56 n.7 (―[T]he government [need not] prove the kind of harm described in the letters 
to establish the applicability of the multiple victim enhancement.  We simply offer these accounts in 
support of our position that such withdrawals, whatever the particulars of the impact in an individual 
case, do represent real economic harm.‖) (emphasis added). 
121. Id. at 56–57. 
122. The provision reads as follows:  
Loss shall be reduced by the following:  
(i) The money returned, and the fair market value of the property 
returned and the services rendered, by the defendant or other persons acting 
jointly with the defendant, to the victim before the offense was detected.  
The time of detection of the offense is the earlier of (I) the time the offense 
was discovered by a victim or government agency; or (II) the time the 
defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the offense was 
detected or about to be detected by a victim or government agency. 
(ii) In a case involving collateral pledged or otherwise provided by the 
defendant, the amount the victim has recovered at the time of sentencing 
from disposition of the collateral, or if the collateral has not been disposed 
of by that time, the fair market value of the collateral at the time of 
sentencing. 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E) (2009). 
123. Id. (emphasis added). 
124. Stepanian, 570 F.3d at 56.   
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or return of goods.
125
 
United States v. Lee is factually distinguishable from most cases that have 
addressed the reimbursed victims issue in that many of the victims had to 
spend considerable time and effort before mitigating their damages.
126
  The 
victim-merchants resorted to repossession and foreclosure to reclaim their 
property, and in some cases it took them more than a year to secure the 
necessary legal judgments.
127
  Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit later 
extended the broad definition—albeit in an unpublished case—to a factual 




Under the broad interpretation, courts need not prove actual harm separate 
from the initial loss in order to include individuals as victims.  Instead, the 
fact that the loss occurred at all is sufficient to justify their inclusion.  The 
lack of necessity to prove a more permanent loss is what separates the ―broad‖ 
line of cases from the middle ground discussed below.
129
  In the following 
cases, the government must prove that the reimbursed party actually suffered 
a loss and quantify that loss in addition to the reimbursed money. 
C.  United States v. Abiodun—A Middle Ground? 
Rejecting both the categorical exclusion and the automatic inclusion of 
reimbursed individuals as victims, the following cases take a practical 
approach to the problem.  The two circuits deciding cases in this line assessed 
whether the purported victims practically suffered an adverse effect that could 
be measured in economic terms.  United States v. Abiodun
130
 is the leading 
case in this line. 
In Abiodun, a defendant engaged in an identity theft scheme where he 
used credit reports belonging to other people to access the equity on their 
credit cards.
131
  After receiving a credit report, the defendant would contact 
the individual‘s bank or lender to report a change of address and, several days 
 
125. United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 895 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).   
126. Id. 
127. Id.  Though the defendants were generally loathe to repay any of the defrauded businesses, 
a threat from a hair replacement therapy business to stop treatments generated quick repayment.  Id. 
at 886. 
128. See United States v. Cornelius, 202 F. Appx. 437, 439 (11th Cir. 2006) (―In Lee, we . . . 
distinguished Yagar on the grounds that the losses suffered by the victims were not short-term or 
subject to indemnity.  However, . . . the Guidelines allow a court to find an actual loss by a 
reimbursed party, and therefore treat that party as a victim.‖). 
129. See infra Part III.C. 
130. (Abiodun II), 536 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2008). 
131. Id. at 164–65. 
2009] TEMPORARY VICTIMS 861 
later, a damaged card.
132
  The companies would thus send new cards to the 
defendant‘s address.  He then withdrew money and purchased merchandise 
using the new cards.
133
  As in the previous cases, banks and credit card 
companies reimbursed the cardholders for their losses.
134
  Police apprehended 
the defendant after he participated in this scheme for more than five years.
135
 





 and conspiracy to commit wire fraud,
138
 and the trial 
court sentenced him to ninety-six months in prison.
139
  Included in the 
sentencing determination was a six-level Guidelines enhancement based on 
the number of victims, as the trial court concluded that it was ―‗more likely 
than not‘‖ that the defendant‘s fraud involved more than 250 victims.140  The 
victim total included dozens of corporate victims, a small number of 
individuals who lost money, and a large number of individuals who ―spent an 
appreciable amount of time securing reimbursement for their financial 
losses.‖141  Though the trial court counted as victims those individuals who 
suffered monetary loss due to the value of their lost time, it did not include the 
value of this time in its loss calculation.
142
 
On appeal, the defendant argued that under United States v. Yagar,
143
 
individuals who are fully reimbursed for their losses cannot be considered 
victims for the purposes of the Guidelines enhancement.
144
  The government, 
on the other hand, relied on United States v. Lee
145
 in arguing that even 
reimbursed parties are victims.
146
  The court fashioned a test that largely split 
the difference between the two lines.
147
  According to the Second Circuit: 
 
132. United States v. Abiodun (Abiodun I), 442 F. Supp. 2d 88, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
133. Id.  The crime was lucrative; the defendant ―wore Armani and Versace suits, Movado 
watches, and Cartier glasses, and drove a Lexus.‖  Id. at 94. 
134. Abiodun II, 536 F.3d at 166.   
135. Id. at 164. 
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2000). 
137. 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (2000). 
138. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000). 
139. Abiodun II, 536 F.3d at 163. 
140. Id. at 166 (quoting the trial court at sentencing). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 169. 
143. 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005). 
144. Abiodun II, 536 F.3d at 168. 
145. 427 F.3d 881, 895 (11th Cir. 2005). 
146. Abiodun II, 536 F.3d at 168.  The government made this argument in United States v. 
Armstead as well, arguing that the reimbursed individuals were victims at the moment of the loss and 
remained so.  552 F.3d 769, 781 (9th Cir. 2008).  As in all cases but those within the ―broad 
interpretation‖ line, the court rejected the argument.  Id. at 781–82. 
147. Abiodun II, 536 F.3d at 168–69. 
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[I]ndividuals who are ultimately reimbursed by their banks or 
credit card companies can be considered ―victims‖ of a theft 
or fraud offense for purposes of [the number-of-victims 
Guidelines enhancement] if—as a practical matter—they 
suffered (1) an adverse effect (2) as a result of the defendant‘s 
conduct that (3) can be measured in monetary terms.
148
 
Thus, the court held that the individual victims in this case who were 
reimbursed by their banks and credit card companies were victims as long as 
the trial court could determine that they spent ―an appreciable amount of 
time‖ ensuring reimbursement and that the value of the time spent could be 
measured monetarily.
149
  Because the trial court failed to include the value of 
this lost time, the Second Circuit remanded the case with instructions for the 
district court to: ―(1) recalculate the loss amount associated with each of the 
defendants‘ crimes to include the time lost by these potential victims or (2) 
determine whether, if these individuals are excluded from the count, it is still 
‗more likely than not‘ that Abiodun‘s crimes affected ‗250-plus victims.‘‖150 
Though the Abiodun court concluded that it was simply applying the 
reasoning of Yagar, the court clearly went beyond Yagar‘s holding.  In Yagar, 
the court found that the individuals suffered no adverse effect and, hence, 
were not victims.
151
  The court further speculated, in vague dicta, that there 
―may be situations‖ where reimbursed individuals could be victims, but it 
provided no examples as to what situations might qualify.
152
  The Second 
Circuit in Abiodun, however, held that any time there is an adverse effect 
 
148. Id.  The court in Armstead took a similar approach: 
A loss that is reimbursed immediately does not amount to a pecuniary harm 
because the ultimate loss cannot be measured in monetary terms.  If, however, 
the reimbursement takes a longer period of time [and requires a great deal of 
effort on the part of the individual], it is conceivable that the individual may 
[suffer additional pecuniary harm that is not fully reimbursed].  If that loss is 
included in the loss calculation, the victim associated with the loss should be 
included in the victim calculation. 
Armstead, 552 F.3d at 782 (citations omitted). 
149. Abiodun II, 536 F.3d at 169.  The trial court in this case did not measure the value of this 
lost time or include this value in the total loss calculation.  In failing to do so, the court violated the 
Guidelines rule that ―victims‖ include only those who have sustained an actual loss.  Thus, the court 
remanded the case to the trial court to measure the value of this lost time and include it in the total 
loss calculation.  Id. 
150. Id. (citation omitted).  Likewise, the Armstead court remanded with instructions for the 
district court to quantify the loss of the reimbursed parties and include it in the loss calculation.  
Armstead, 552 F.3d at 783.  For example, if the cost of obtaining a new driver‘s license was not 
included in the reimbursement, the court could simply multiply the number of defrauded individuals 
by the cost of a Washington driver‘s license, and add the total to the loss calculation.  See id. 
151. United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005). 
152. Id. 
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measurable in monetary terms, a reimbursed individual can be considered a 
victim.
153
  In adopting such a broad, bright-line test, the court created a more 
lenient standard than did the Yagar court. 
IV.  THE ABIODUN APPROACH IS SUPERIOR 
Since these cases were decided, the Federal Sentencing Commission 
amended the commentary to section 2B1.1 to include an additional victim 
definition specific solely to crimes involving the use of ―means of 
identification.‖  Under the amendment, an individual is a victim if he meets 
the definition in the remainder of the section or if his ―means of identification 
was used unlawfully or without authority.‖154  Without changing the overall 
definition of ―victim,‖ the commission nevertheless adopted the broad 
approach taken by the Stepanian court. 
There are advantages to such an amendment.  First, it eliminates the 
circuit split and ensures that courts are likely to treat these crimes in a similar 
fashion.  Further, an interpretation that automatically includes reimbursed 
parties is superior to one that automatically excludes them.  The former 
interpretation recognizes that it is possible for reimbursed parties to suffer a 
loss, while the latter completely precludes such a possibility.  Indeed, the 
Commission recognized the flaw in the narrow definition of ―victim‖: that 
reimbursed individuals ―must often spend significant time resolving credit 
problems and related issues, and such lost time may not be adequately 
accounted for in the loss calculations.‖155  Further, the amendment is efficient; 
rather than requiring courts to determine the value of lost time, it lets them 
simply add individuals to the victim total. 
This amendment nevertheless sacrifices accuracy at the altar of efficiency.  
By automatically including reimbursed parties as victims, there is no way to 
distinguish between a crime where parties spent hundreds of hours seeking 
reimbursement from a crime where the parties were completely unaware of a 
loss.  Establishing such a broad rule penalizes criminals in cases where 
―victims‖ were unaware that they were victimized and marginalizes true 
victims whose lives are upended by a fraud crime.
156
 
The better route would have been to codify the Abiodun interpretation, 
interpreting ―victim‖ to include any individuals who spent any amount of time 
making themselves whole as a result of the defendant‘s crime, but not those 
who are unaware of the loss before reimbursement or spend no time or money 
 
153. Abiodun II, 536 F.3d at 168–69. 
154. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.4(E) (2009). 
155. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 74 Fed. Reg. 21,750, 21,751 (May 8, 
2009) (amending the commentary to USSG § 2B1.1). 
156. Of course, courts may deviate from Guidelines-recommended sentences, but, in practice, 
deviations are the exception rather than the norm. 
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securing reimbursement.
157
  First, the plain text of the Guidelines prior to the 
amendment supported such a reading.  Whether an individual is a victim 
under this section turned on whether that person suffered a loss that is ―readily 
measurable in money.‖158  Because an individual‘s time is readily measurable 
in money, courts should include it in the loss calculation.  Further, the 
commentary specifically excludes a series of items from the loss 
calculation,
159
 but did not exclude the monetary value of time spent by 
victims.  Second, the purposes of the Guidelines support the Abiodun 
approach.  Including time-based losses more accurately ties a defendant‘s 
punishment to the severity of her crime, which promotes proportionate 
sentencing.  Thus, the Commission should have adopted an amendment that 
recognized reimbursed individuals, as victims only if they spent time securing 
such reimbursement. 
A.  A Plain Reading of the Guidelines Supports the Abiodun Approach 
Whether to include an individual as a victim turns on whether the 
individual suffered a part of the actual loss determined in the loss 
calculation.
160
  That decision depends on whether the loss is a reasonably 
foreseeable pecuniary harm.
161
  No one seriously disputes that an individual 
cancelling a credit card, requesting a fraud alert, or contacting a bank is a 
―reasonably foreseeable‖ consequence of a fraud crime.162  Thus, the inquiry 
turns on whether the time invested in such actions is pecuniary harm.  Again, 
pecuniary harm is ―harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily 
measurable in money.‖163 
The value of lost time is ―readily measurable in money‖ using the 
―opportunity cost‖ of the lost time.164  Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
opportunity cost as ―[t]he cost of acquiring an asset measured by the value of 
an alternative investment that is forgone.‖165  Economists, however, use 
 
157. One exception to this rule would be for individuals who spent time only in cooperating 
with prosecutors or police as part of the government‘s investigation.  The Guidelines specifically 
exclude ―costs incurred by victims primarily to aid the government in[] the prosecution and criminal 
investigation of an offense.‖  USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(D)(ii) (2009). 
158. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii). 
159. E.g., id. (excluding emotional distress and harm to reputation from the loss calculation). 
160. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1. 
161. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(i). 
162. A consequence of the crime is reasonably foreseeable when the defendant knew or 
reasonably should have known that the consequence was a ―potential result of the offense.‖  Id. 
§ 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iv). 
163. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii). 
164. Opportunity cost is ―[p]erhaps the most fundamental concept in economics.‖  DAVID W. 
PEARCE, THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 315 (David W. Pearce & Robert Shaw 
eds., 4th ed. 1992). 
165. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 398 (9th ed. 2009).   
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opportunity cost more broadly to measure the value of lost time as well: 
When economists refer to the ―opportunity cost‖ of a 
resource, they mean the value of the next-highest-valued 
alternative use of that resource.  If, for example, you spend 
time . . . going to a movie, you cannot spend that time at 
home reading a book . . . .  If your next-best alternative to 
seeing the movie is reading the book, then the opportunity 
cost of seeing the movie is the money spent plus the pleasure 
you forgo by not reading the book.
166
 
Thus, the opportunity cost of an hour spent contacting a bank or credit 
reporting agency because of a fraud crime is the value of the hour to the 
individual in spending that hour as she would have done but for the crime.
167
 
Using opportunity cost, economists are readily able to measure the 
monetary value of time, even if most judges are not trained to do so.  That 
judges cannot measure this value with scientific precision is not an 
impediment to using opportunity cost to value time. The Guidelines 
commentary notes, ―[t]he court need only make a reasonable estimate of the 
loss.  The sentencing judge is in a unique position to assess the evidence and 
estimate the loss based upon that evidence.‖168  Consequently, as long as the 
court can reasonably estimate the value of the time, it can include it in the loss 
calculations. 
Because the value of time is readily measurable in money, courts should 
include this value in their loss calculations unless another section of the 
Guidelines excludes such losses.  Though the Guidelines specifically exclude 
 
166. David R. Henderson, Opportunity Cost, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 
44, 44 (David R. Henderson ed., 1993).  As an additional example, the cost of attending college is 
not only tuition, but also the salary the student forgoes by choosing school rather than work.  Id. at 
44–45. 
 At least one federal court has used opportunity cost in a similar manner.  In determining the 
reasonability of an attorney‘s hourly rate in a case awarding attorney‘s fees, the court noted that the 
attorney‘s opportunity cost was the amount he forewent by representing the client at issue or, in other 
words, ―the rate the attorney could have received from a client whom he charged by the hour for the 
same type of work.‖  Morimanno v. Taco Bell, 979 F. Supp. 791, 797 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (emphasis 
omitted). 
167. One possible concern about this method is that different opportunity costs could undercut 
the proportionality goal of the Guidelines by valuing different victims‘ time at different rates, and 
thus imposing different sentences for similar crimes.  For example, the value of a law firm managing 
partner‘s time is likely higher than that of a retiree.  There are two responses to such an objection.  
First, because ―[t]he court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss,‖ USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. 
n.3(C), it could estimate the value of the lost time across all the victims, rather than making a 
separate calculation for each victim.  Second, as a practical matter, it is highly unlikely that adding 
the value of the opportunity cost into the loss calculation will move a defendant into a different loss 
category, given the size of most of the categories.  See id. § 2B1.1(b)(1).   
168. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C).  Because the Guidelines call for only a reasonable estimate, a 
judge does not need to be a trained economist to perform the necessary opportunity cost calculations.  
866 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [93:845 
several types of losses, they do not discuss lost time or similar items. 
One such exclusion is for ―emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other 
non-economic harm.‖169  Lost time is qualitatively different from emotional 
distress and harm to reputation.  Emotional distress and harm to reputation are 
ethereal concepts that courts cannot reasonably measure.  Whereas courts can 
estimate lost time in units (e.g., minutes or hours) and convert these units to 
dollar amounts (using opportunity cost), no similar measurements can be 
made for these other types of harm.
170
 
The argument that lost time falls into the catchall ―other non-economic 
harm‖171 category is similarly unavailing.  Based on its usage in the section, it 
is clear that ―other non-economic harm‖ simply refers to items that are neither 
monetary nor readily measurable in money.  The full definition of pecuniary 
harm is ―harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily measurable in 
money. Accordingly, pecuniary harm does not include emotional distress, 
harm to reputation, or other non-economic harm.‖172  The use of the word 
―[a]ccordingly‖ indicates a relationship between the first sentence and the 
second, whereby the latter sentence is a conclusion based in part on the former 
sentence‘s major premise.  Thus, the text indicates that the Commission was 
simply distinguishing between items that are measurable in money and those 
that are not.  Because lost time is measurable in money, as discussed above, it 
does not fall into the latter category. 
The Guidelines commentary also excludes ―[i]nterest of any kind, finance 
charges, late fees, penalties, amounts based on an agreed-upon return or rate 
of return, or other similar costs‖ from the loss calculation.173  The defendant in 
United States v. Armstead argued that the court could not include any time-
based losses due to their similarity to the losses excluded in this section.
174
  In 
his brief, the defendant argued that ―the costs [the reimbursed individuals] 
incurred—getting a new driver‘s license or correcting a credit report—were 
exactly the type of routine finance costs and fees that the Application Note 
explicitly excludes from the enhancement‘s coverage.‖175 
The Ninth Circuit did not address this argument because it remanded the 
case on other grounds.
176
  Had the court addressed it, however, it should have 
 
169. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii). 
170. Indeed, it would be impossible for courts to determine how many units of emotional 
distress a ―victim‖ suffered. 
171. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii).  
172. Id. 
173. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(D)(i). 
174. 552 F.3d 769, 783 n.14 (9th Cir. 2008). 
175. Appellant‘s Opening Brief at 46, United States v. Armstead, 552 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(No. 06-30550). 
176. Armstead, 552 F.3d at 784–85. 
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rejected it.  Lost time is qualitatively different from finance charges and 
interest.  Note that the appellant in Armstead subtly changed the language in 
the commentary; the appellant argued that the language stands for all ―routine 
finance costs.‖177  In reality, the language refers to only a specified type of 
financial losses, those related to interest, fees, penalties, and the like.  The cost 
of obtaining a new driver‘s license, contacting a bank or credit card company, 
and retrieving a credit history are simply different from lost interest from a 
savings account or late fees on a credit card bill.  The language in the 
commentary excludes just the latter, not the former. 
Had the Commission wanted to exclude the value of lost time from the 
calculation, it could have explicitly done so.  By failing to do so, and by 
expressly creating several exceptions, the canon of construction expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius
178
 should prevent courts from reading additional 
exceptions into the text.  This canon of construction frowns upon judicial 
expansion of lists created by legislatures (or, in this case, quasi-legislative 
bodies), especially in situations where courts examine exceptions to a general 
rule: ―Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general 
prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of 
evidence of a contrary legislative intent.‖179  Courts should not read additional 
exclusions into the loss provision without an indication that the Commission 
intended such exclusions.
180
  Because no such intent is present, courts should 
not exclude the value of lost time from their loss calculations. 
Because the value of lost time is readily measurable in money, and 
because the Commission provides no reason to exclude it from the loss 
calculation, courts should include such losses in their determination.  As such, 
they should also include the victims whose lost time accounts for these losses 
when tallying the number of victims of the fraud. 
B.  The Abiodun Approach Is Most Consistent with the Purposes of the 
Guidelines 
Just as the pre-amendment plain text of the fraud and theft guideline made 
clear that courts should include the value of lost time when determining 
whether reimbursed individuals are victims, congressional intent further 
 
177. Appellant‘s Opening Brief at 46, Armstead, 552 F.3d 769 (No. 06-30550). 
178. The expression of one is the exclusion of others.  See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 661 
(9th ed. 2009).  This canon has been criticized as illogical.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory 
Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 806 (1983).  Yet, it 
retains its most persuasive force when dealing with exceptions to a general rule.  See Nat‘l Ass‘n of 
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 677–78 (2007) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 
153, 188 (1978)). 
179. Andrus v. Glover Const. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980). 
180. See id. at 616–19. 
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supports this interpretation.  Uniform sentencing requires courts across the 
nation to consistently apply the Guidelines; thus, circuit splits should be 
avoided where possible.  Further, proportionate sentencing dictates that 
defendants who cause more harm should be punished more severely than 
those who cause less harm.
181
  All other things being equal, defendants whose 
crimes require many individuals to spend time seeking reimbursement cause 
more harm than others; therefore, these defendants should receive longer 
sentences.  Thus, including reimbursed individuals as victims when they 
spend time securing reimbursement is faithful to congressional intent, as well 
as to the text of the Guidelines. 
Uniform sentencing requires that similar defendants who commit similar 
crimes receive similar sentences.  Congress saw uniform sentencing as a key 
element in its plan to ―enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to 
combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing system.‖182  Prior to the use 
of the Guidelines, wide disparities in sentencing and time served existed for 
―similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders.‖183  The 
Guidelines combat these disparities by creating objective standards and 
categories that judges use to determine a recommended sentencing range.
184
  
Though courts may deviate from this range, the range provides a consistent 
starting point from which courts must work.  While this system does not 
guarantee perfect uniformity, it is significantly more uniform than the pre-
Guidelines system where a court chose a sentence from a large statutory 
window and parole boards determined how much of the sentence was served. 
Courts jeopardize even the pretense of uniformity, however, when they 
apply the Guidelines in varying fashions.  When courts fail to apply rules 
consistently, the recommended sentencing range for similar criminal conduct 
committed by similarly situated defendants may differ significantly.  If 
recommended sentencing ranges for similar defendants committing similar 
crimes vary significantly, there is little reason for courts to go through the 
elaborate process required in applying the Guidelines.  Thus, regardless of the 
outcome, it is important that courts apply the number-of-victims enhancement 
in a consistent fashion. 
To ensure uniform sentencing, consistency is imperative.  By including as 
a victim anyone whose means of identification was used, the recent 
amendment ensures uniformity.  To ensure uniform and proportionate 
 
181. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 819 (1991) (―[T]he assessment of harm caused by 
the defendant . . . has understandably been an important concern of the criminal law . . . in 
determining the appropriate punishment.  Thus, two equally blameworthy criminal defendants may 
be guilty of different offenses solely because their acts cause differing amounts of harm.‖). 
182. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2009). 
183. Id. 
184. See supra Part II.B. 
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sentencing, however, the better approach would have been for courts to 
consistently apply the Abiodun definition of ―victim.‖  In a sense, 
proportionality is a corollary of uniformity: If the same criminals committing 
the same crimes receive the same sentences, the same criminals committing 
more serious crimes should receive longer sentences.  The specificity of the 
Guidelines attempts to measure incremental differences in the seriousness of 
crimes in order to ―impose[] appropriately different sentences for criminal 
conduct of differing severity.‖185 
The most significant way that courts stratify sentence length under the 
fraud and theft guideline is via the enhancement based on amount of loss.
186
  
A loss of $400 million or more will raise the offense level by thirty levels.
187
  
As noted above, this makes sense: the most important factor in determining 
the severity of a fraud or theft crime is the amount of money stolen.
188
 
The monetary loss alone, however, may be insufficient to measure the 
total gravity of an offense.  The following cases are three hypothetical 
examples where the monetary loss is the same but the harm inflicted differs.  
In Case 1, a defendant secures a $1,000,000 loan from a bank and absconds 
with the money.  In Case 2, the defendant uses a bank fraud scheme to steal 
$10,000 out of 100 different individual accounts at the same bank.  Though 
the individual account holders are aware of the loss and take steps to secure 
reimbursement and protect their credit ratings, the $1,000,000 loss is borne by 
the bank.  In Case 3, the defendant does the same as the defendant in Case 2, 
but the individuals are reimbursed immediately and remain unaware of the 
temporary loss. 
In terms of monetary loss, the outcomes are the same: In each case, the 
bank has lost $1,000,000.  Yet, the amount of harm inflicted differs.  In the 
first and third cases, the harm inflicted seems to end with the $1,000,000 loss.  
In the second case, the bank suffers the same loss, but 100 additional 
individuals suffer harm as well.  Using a highly conservative estimate, assume 
the individuals spent an average of one hour each contacting their bank, 
repeatedly checking their credit histories and ratings, and requesting new 
debit cards or changing passwords.  The second fraud thus costs individuals a 
 
185. USSG § 1A1.3. 
186. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
187. Id.  The recommended sentence for a first-time offender at level 6 is 0–6 months, and the 
court has the authority to impose probation in lieu of jail time.  Id. § 5A.  At level 36, the 
recommended sentence is 188–235 months.  Id.  
188. For an example of the importance of the loss total to the severity of the crime, see the 
fraud of Bernard Madoff, the New York financier whose Ponzi scheme may have cost investors  
$50 billion.  Mr. Madoff received a 150-year sentence for his crimes.  See Diana B. Henriques, 
Madoff, Apologizing, Is Given 150 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A1. 
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total of 100 productive hours from their lives.
189
 
Under a narrow definition of ―pecuniary loss‖ and ―victim,‖ the crimes in 
the first two scenarios would receive the same treatment.
190
  Under the broad 
definition, adopted by the Commission with the recent amendment, the second 
and third cases are treated the same.  The Abiodun definition, however, best 
differentiates between the different amounts of harm caused in each scenario.  
This result accords with the Guidelines‘ goal of proportionate sentencing: 
Because the second crime inflicted more harm than the first or the third, the 




Thus, in addition to complying with the text of the Guidelines, a broad 
interpretation of ―victims‖ serves the goals of uniform and proportionate 
sentencing. 
C.  Applying the Abiodun Interpretation 
Again, a hypothetical might best illustrate how a court would apply the 
broad interpretation of ―victim‖ expounded above.  To continue with the facts 
of Case 2, assume the defendant went to trial and was convicted of bank fraud 
based on the $1,000,000 he stole from the 100 bank accounts. 
Under the Abiodun test, the court could not ―double count‖ losses as 
belonging to both individuals and corporate lenders.
192
  Unlike the broad line 
of cases, the monetary loss will apply only to the bank, as the ultimate bearer 
of that loss.
193
  Unlike the narrow line, however, courts would be able to 
include a reimbursed individual any time the government proved that the 
individual spent time dealing with the issues arising from the defendant‘s 
criminal conduct.  Thus, an individual who spends even fifteen minutes on the 
phone with her credit card company to alert the company of a fraudulent 




189. In reality, victims of identity theft typically spend much more than one hour trying to 
restore their credit and ensure reimbursement.  A 2003 federal study estimated that victims spent an 
average of two to nine hours resulting from the crime, with 6% of individuals spending more than 
240 hours.  FED. TRADE COMM‘N, IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 45 (2003), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/synovatereport.pdf.  In addition, 37% of individuals paid money out 
of pocket due to the crime.  Id. at 43. 
190. Without any additional enhancements or mitigating factors, the offense level for both 
crimes would be twenty (6—the base offense level—plus 14—a loss of more than $400,000).  USSG 
§ 2B1.1. 
191. See id. § 1A1.3 for a discussion of proportionality in sentencing. 
192. See United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 491 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Yagar, 
404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005). 
193. Further, individuals could not be added on the basis of lost interest, which is excluded 
from the loss calculation in USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(D)(i). 
194. Again, note that under this interpretation there will be circumstances where reimbursed 
individuals do not qualify as victims.  In cases where reimbursement truly is instantaneous, as the 
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When making a loss determination
195
 for the defendant in Case 2, the trial 
court would add the value of the lost time to the value of the money stolen.  
Assume that the court concluded that $25 per hour is a reasonable value of the 
average individual‘s time lost in the fraud.196  The value of 100 hours lost then 
would be $2,500.
197
  Thus, the total loss resulting from the crime would be 
$1,002,500.
198
  By including this extra $2,500 in the loss calculation, the court 
then would be free to include the individual victims when determining 
whether a number-of-victims enhancement applies.  Because the court 
concluded that roughly 100 individuals suffered losses in addition to the bank, 




To include the individuals in the sentencing determination, the 
government would need to prove that the individuals spent time responding to 
and mitigating the fraud.  Courts would not be able to rely on ―‗garden-variety 
logic‘‖200 in order to apply the enhancement; prosecutors or presentence 
investigation reports would need to present evidence of such losses.  Despite 
its ultimate adoption of the broad interpretation of ―victim,‖ the Stepanian 
court provides a good example of how this could be done.  Before applying 
the broad interpretation, the court noted the stories of victims who suffered 
real financial burdens as a result of the crime charged.
201
  Instead of simply 
listing these individuals as victims, the court should have made an attempt to 
quantify their loss based on these stories and then add it to the financial loss 
eventually borne by the reimbursing banks.  While the Abiodun approach 
takes longer and is less efficient than the automatic inclusion provision 
adopted in the most recent edition of the Guidelines, it more accurately 
reflects the severity of a fraud crime. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The circuit split discussed above made a mockery of the sentencing 
 
courts in Yagar and Conner discussed, many individuals will lose no time as a result of the fraud.   
See Conner, 537 F.3d at 491; Yagar, 404 F.3d at 971.  Thus, they would not be victims. 
195. USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
196. The final value placed on the lost time is, of course, less important than the fact that the 
court is valuing the time because the purpose of valuing the time is to include the victims in the 
victim calculation.  It is unlikely that the additional loss resulting from the value of the lost time will 
change the sentencing recommendation.  See supra note 167. 
197. Twenty-five dollars per hour multiplied by 100 hours is $2,500. 
198. If the court so desired, it could also calculate the value of the lost time suffered by the 
bank as a result of the fraud, although it is unlikely that doing so would make any difference to the 
defendant‘s ultimate sentence. 
199. USSG § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B). 
200. United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 491 (5th Cir. 2008). 
201. United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2009). 
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principles of uniformity and proportionality.  Defendants in some cases had 
enhancements applied to them that may not have been applied in other 
circuits.  In the Yagar line of cases, individuals who may have rationally 
viewed themselves as victims were not considered as such.  In the Stepanian 
line, individuals who may have had no knowledge of the crime were 
considered victims.  In such a chaotic environment, the Guidelines 
amendment holds considerable appeal. 
Nevertheless, the amendment represents the triumph of efficiency over 
accuracy in sentencing.  The Sentencing Commission‘s solution is overbroad 
and does not accurately reflect the harm inflicted during the crime.  By simply 
including every single person whose means were used, the Commission 
equates the harm caused to a ―victim‖ who was unaware of the theft with that 
of a ―victim‖ who spent months trying to clear his name with a credit agency.  
While the new definition has the advantage of being easy to calculate, it is far 
too blunt an instrument for a procedure as important as sentencing. 
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